The Israeli Classical Liberal Web Site JABOTINSKIAN-LIBERAL APPROACH TO THE ARAB-JEWISH CONFLICT by Noah Nissani Jabotinsky demanded an equitable solution for both peoples...two autonomous peoples sharing the same land and each governing their own personal, cultural and religious lives. Copyright 1996 -- Authorized free distribution of non-modified copies for non-commercial purposes. ------------------------------------------------------------ The author is a physicist of the Ben Gurion University (Ret.) who has published among other scientific works the monograph: "SL(2,C) Gauge Theory of Gravitation", Physics Reports, 109/2 (1984), and is coauthor of the book: "Gravitation", World Scientific, (1989). ------------------------------------------------------------- TAKE NOTE: Political terminology takes on different meanings in different times and different places. "Liberal" is used here in its nineteenth century meaning, which was Jabotinsky's ideology. INTRODUCTION Jabotinsky did not have any illusions about a peaceful return of the Jews to their historic homeland. It was clear to him that neither the historic bond of the Jews to their homeland nor the legal status conferred by the San Remo Conference and later ratified by the League of Nations would convince the Arabs to relinquish even a minimal part of their extensive territory. In order to avoid a conflict between its Marxist anti-nationalist and Zionist-nationalist ideologies, the Left had to ignore the presence and legitimate rights of the Arabs. However, for Jabotinsky, who was identified with the nationalist Liberalism of the nineteenth century, this conflict did not exist. In his view, the reconquest of the historic Jewish homeland was morally justified by virtue of a people's right -- one deeply-rooted in the liberal tradition (1) -- to wage war and conquer, if this is necessary for the survival of the people. Therefore, Jabotinsky had no ideological need to ignore either the presence of the Arabs or their legitimate rights. In his understanding, the armed conflict between the two peoples was inevitable, simply because no people on earth will relinquish any part of its land without fighting (2). The hope of a peaceful realization of Zionism is, therefore, a dangerous fallacy. Nevertheless, Jabotinsky, guided by his liberal ideology, demanded a final, equitable solution for both peoples (3). The armed phase of the war foreseen by Jabotinsky was fought and the results have been favorable to us. The power to decide and the concomitant responsibility are presently in our hands. The danger lies in the temptation to exploit the situation in our short-term favor, achieving a seemingly favorable yet unstable peace, as the Allies did at the end of World War I. In the first section of this article the peace policies of the Allies at the end of the two World Wars are compared with each other, and with the Oslo Agreement. The comparison shows that the fatal errors of the Versailles peace are currently being repeated. Jabotinsky's solution, however, shares the liberal spirit of the peace policy implemented at the end of World War II. The second section analyzes the fallacy of the demographic question which, it is claimed, would necessitate choosing between a small Jewish-democratic state, and a larger but non-Jewish or non-democratic one. Certainly, for a Continental-European type of parliamentary democracy -- similar to those that have served as the "democratic" path to power for Marxism, Nazism and Fascism -- this dilemma may be true. Fortunately, however, there are other, more liberal and more stable, forms of democracy (4). The liberal nature and historical performance of different forms of democracy are analyzed. Special attention is paid to the American system of democracy, which did not hesitate to violate the principle of "one man - one vote" in order to satisfy the genuine needs of the constituent sectors of the society. The author is aware of the tremendous difficulties inherent in a genuine liberal solution. At the same time, he is convinced that it is the only kind of solution which affords prospects for a peaceful future. The primary obstacle lies within ourselves -- unfortunately Zionism has been dominated for decades by antiliberal tendencies, and the great majority of Israelis come from countries lacking any liberal tradition whatsoever. - * - * - Section I THE EXPERIENCE of HISTORY and the ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT Let us compare the peace policy of the Western victors at the end of World War I with that pursued at the end of World War II. The two policies were totally different and their outcomes were diametrically opposed. The first one led to the most devastating war of all times, whereas the second gave rise to what seems to be the longest period of peace and prosperity throughout the history of Western Europe. We will limit ourselves to a succinct reference to four conspicuous differences between the peace policies that followed the two world wars and their relevance to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: 1. Peace Has To Precede Its Written Formalization World War I ended with the Versailles Peace Treaty which purported to establish the modality of the future peace. Second World War, on the contrary, came to an end without a peace treaty. The basic conception was that peace must first become an established reality, and only then be formally ratified. If there is anything to be learned from history, it is that peace has to precede its written formalization. Any attempt to theoretically establish the nature of a future relationship is doomed to failure. Only a preexisting situation of peace predisposes the parties to the mutual consideration required to reach a just and stable solution. At the same time, history provides many examples of peoples living in peace and harmony despite unresolved conflicts. The Jordan-Israel peace treaty is an example of such an ex post facto sanction of a preexisting state of good neighborliness. Similarly, the Egyptian-Israeli peace process began with Sadat's clear declaration of "No more war" and the establishment of confidence-building human relations with his memorable visit to Jerusalem. In contrast, the current peace processes with Syria and the Palestinians are attempting to establish peace on paper while hostilities continue. 2. Only a Peace Based on Liberal-Egalitarian Conditions Can Be Stable. First World War I ended with a set of conditions imposed by the winners on the losers, and intended to perpetuate the advantageous position of the former. No provisions were made for a future of equality and justice. The attempt of the American President Wilson to establish a liberal peace trough his famous fourteen points, vanished with the growth American isolationism. By contrast, at the end of World War II the Western Allies, under American leadership, followed the policy of integrating the defeated nations in a liberal world on an egalitarian basis. Shimon Peres' vision of a new Middle East living in peace like the European nations is myopic. It fails to see that whereas the European peace is based on equal status for all inhabitants of the continent, the Oslo Agreement tends to perpetuate a differential situation. The Oslo agreement, like the Versailles Treaty, is a collection of conditions imposed by the winner on the loser. Its supporters assume that the Palestinians will forever be satisfied with a Lilliputian state, or less than a state, which comprises less than a quarter of their original territory, and that they will forever resign themselves to seeing the remaining three-fourths of their motherland in the hands of the Jews. A resident of Nablus expressed this graphically: "How can I bear the fact that my son views the sea through the window, but has to travel to Gaza to swim in it". Such a Palestinian state will necessarily be a chronic source of resentment and irredentism. These feelings will be sharpened by the economic gap, which will be attributed, with some amount of reason, to the long Israeli domination. This state will be a focus of terror, and will wait for the first favorable political or military contingencies to liberate the entire motherland. And in our unstable world there is every likelihood that these contingencies will come about -- sooner or later. This hostile Palestinian state: * situated in the heart of Israel, with its border closely touching all of Israel's major cities (e.g. Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, Beersheva, Netanya, Herzliya); * will form a geographic continuum with the Arab and Muslim world; and control from the highlands 80% of the Israeli population densely concentrated in a narrow strip between the Muslim world and the sea. It certainly constitutes a mortal danger that only irresponsible politicians would dare espouse. Jabotinsky's solution, while totally at total variance with the Oslo agreement, is in complete harmony with the spirit of liberal European peace. It recognizes the existence of two peoples, each with a legitimate claim to the very same land: the Jews, who demand the right to return to their ancient homeland from which were dispossessed by force, and the Arab inhabitants of this land. "Each of the ethnic communities will be recognized as autonomous and equal in the eyes of the law," says Jabotinsky (3), who envisioned two autonomous peoples sharing the same land and each governing their own personal, cultural and religious lives. This is possible since people of different cultures and religions can coexist in liberal societies without inconveniencing each other. This is specially true in the Jewish-Arab case since the ethnic, cultural and religious differences between Arabs and Jews are less pronounced than those which set apart the various ethnic communities in the U.S.. 3. War Fatigue, Extreme Pacifism and Isolationism are Dangerous Moods(5) The end of World War I was characterized by a mood of extreme pacifism and war fatigue among the victorious nations. This mood induced the naive belief that peace can be attained through disarmament, and that the defense of liberal civilization against Marxism can be achieved by arming an antagonistic extremism. In the attitude of the European Allies we find a tragic paradox: yearning for peace on the one hand, and the desire to enjoy the fruits of the victory on the other. In U.S., war fatigue led to isolationism, i.e. the belief that whatever happens on the other side of the ocean is not an American concern. At end of the Second World War, however, a different attitude prevailed, namely the conviction that preparedness for any war, even a nuclear war, is essential to make peace and freedom possible. Neither naive pacifism, nor American isolationism appeared. The quoted Biblical lesson(5) seems to have been learned. Had this dangerous mood not been so ensconced in the spirit of the Western Allies at the end of the First World War, the history of the bloody 20th century might have been quite different. The Oslo Agreement, fruit of a mood similar to that of the Western Allies at the end of World War I, is based on the delusion that peace can be attained by separating the two peoples. In this respect it resembles American isolationism, with the oceans replaced by a green line drawn on a map. We find in Oslo Agreement the same tragic dilemma faced by the European Allies at the end of World War I between the avidity for enjoying the advantages of the victory and the impatience for peace. 4. Only Ground-Based Security Measures Are Effective At the end of World War I security measures, such as armament restrictions, were provided for on paper -- yet they were violated before the ink dried. However, World War II ended with strict security precautions firmly established on the ground -- Germany was divided and militarily occupied for an unspecified period. The security measures delineated in peace treaties, international guaranties and other signed papers have a very limited degree of reliability, and remain in force only as long as favorable circumstances exist. However, since circumstances change unpredictably, only facts on the ground can ensure stability during the process of peace-building. As in the Versailles treaty, the Oslo agreement has delineated security measures on paper, while responsibility for security on the ground has been transferred to the Palestinians from the very outset. Moreover, it is assumed that the future Palestinian state will be demilitarized as Germany was at the end of World War I. In the case of Germany, the Marxist menace quickly nullified the signed agreement, and the result was the bloodiest war in history. -x-x- The practicality of the Jabotinskian scheme hinges on two preconditions: 1. The Arabs must be convinced that they currently lack the power to halt the return of Jews to their historic homeland, and that the price of continuing the conflict is too high to bear. 2. The Jews must be convinced that there are no other solutions with similar prospects for peace and security. Apparently, the first precondition has been achieved, as evidenced in the Palestinian participation in the Madrid Conference as part of the Jordanian delegation, and by their acceptance of the Oslo Agreement, in the hope that more fortuitous circumstances would develop in the future. The second precondition, however, has yet to be achieved, and that was the motive for writing the present article. We have won the war, but are on the road toward losing the peace. Nothing endangers us more than the assumption that the present political and military situation is guaranteed to continue in the future. Any agreement must be judged in terms of its prospects for stability in a world of constant change. Only a liberal-egalitarian peace, that takes the rights and needs of both peoples into account, can provide the required stability. The autonomy proposed by Jabotinsky for both ethnic communities can take various forms, but two principles that must be strictly maintained: 1. The life and security of the Jews are in jeopardy in the Diaspora, where they are a minority everywhere, as well as in Israel where they are surrounded by a sea of Arabs and Muslims. Therefore the Jews have the right to demand control of immigration and security. 2. The Arabs' rights have been violated by the Jewish majority in our totalitarian-constitutionless democracy. The Arabs have the right to demand effective constitutional measures to ensure their rights. These principles differentiate between Jews and Arabs as two distinct elements of a heterogeneous society. Both parties have their own needs, problems and concerns. A Continental- European parliamentary democracy lacks the required tools for satisfying the needs of such a heterogeneous society. Fortunately, as we have already said in the introduction, there are other forms of democracy (4). The following section attempts to elucidate this question. - * - * - (1) Montesquieu, Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de (1689-1755) "The Spirit of the Laws" (1748) "States have the right to wage war for their own preservation" pg.138. "From the right of war derives that of conquest" pg.139. (2) Wladimir (Ze'ev) Jabotinsky "We and the Arabs -- The Iron Wall" (1923). See (3) W. Jabotinsky "The Arab Question -- Without Dramatics" (1942) (4) Alberdi Juan Bautista (1810-84) "The Bases" (1852) "Happily the republic so rich in forms, ...., is adaptable to all the demands.." (5) See Judges 18, 7-10. The tribe of Dan conquers the land of a quiet and secure people. " ...They saw the people .... how they dwelt safely, ... quiet and secure ...When you go you will come to a secure people....For God has given it into your hands". - * - * - Section II DEMOCRACY IN A HETEROGENEOUS SOCIETY One frequently repeated argument in support of the Oslo agreement asserts that choice must inevitable be made between: 1) a democratic Jewish state within the 1967 borders, and 2) a state endangered by a possible future Arab majority. In the latter case, they say, the state could not be simultaneously Jewish and democratic. This argument is correct with respect to an Euro-continental parliamentary democracy kind, which has a deplorable historical record and paved the way for the rise of Nazism, Fascism, and Marxism. In addition to its tragic history, this parliamentary system suffers from basic liberal deficiencies; it generally requires the formation of coalitions which lead to: * Disproportional political power to tiny and often extremist minorities. This is precisely what paved the way for the rise of the above-mentioned regimes. * Corruption: Even the most ideological coalition agreement involves elements of bribery, since political positions are exchanged for compromises in the performance of public functions. * Submission of deputies to the party, which is in line with Lenin's conception of party discipline (6), becomes necessary to assure the fulfillment of the compromises established in the coalition agreement. "The representatives of the people," who are elected to govern on its behalf, become transformed into "delegates of the party" subject to the directives of its central committee. The dependence of the representatives on the party introduces an additional element of bribery: The deputies are required to act against the dictates of their conscience in exchange for support from the party.(7) * It violates the liberal principle of the separation of powers on two counts: First, the executive branch is generated by and subordinate to the parliament (formally, it more like an executive branch of parliament than a separate independent power (8, 9)). And second, because turns the party's central committee into a "superpower" that prevails over the formal ones. The representatives of the legislature and the ministers of the executive branch are controlled by the same power, namely the central committee, and therefore, virtually nothing remains of their formal separation. Lenin's conception of party discipline was the basis for Stalin's dictatorship, who became the absolute ruler of the Soviet Union without holding any government post. In Israel, the Prime Minister is generally the dominant figure in the party, which grants him almost total control of the government and the Knesset. Montesquieu asserts that the unique source of democracy's power is virtue. In his view, Monarchy or aristocracy, can survive with a certain amount of corruption since they have a different source of power, but corrupt democracies soon collapse (10). Indeed, the above-mentioned deficiencies have led in many occasions to the delegitimation of democratically constituted governments and to their replacement by dictatorships. In some cases it is the government itself which, feeling threatened by its loss of legitimacy among the citizens, takes emergency measures that ultimately turn the government into a dictatorship. Such was the case of the Fascism in Italy following the assassination of the socialist leader Giacomo Matteotti. In other cases such as the Spanish Civil War, civil or military forces deposed the elected authorities, regarded by them as delegitimized. Fortunately, there are other forms of democracy which are more liberal and stable. Their prime example is American democracy, which has survived for over two centuries. It should be noted that since its inception, American democracy faced the challenge of building a liberal democracy for a heterogeneous society. In Israel, where nearly a 20% of the population inside the "green line" are Arabs, we face a similar challenge, with or without the Arab populations of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. A liberal democracy in a heterogeneous society must take into account the idiosyncrasies and needs of the diverse components in the society. Otherwise, it would resemble some boys and a girl who form a democratic society in which everything is decided by majority rule. (The result is left to the reader's imagination.) In the American case, the less populated states felt their freedom threatened by the more populated ones. In a strict "one-man one-vote" regime, this threat could have constituted a real danger. The wise solution was to violate the principle of equal political rights in favor of addressing the needs and concerns of each component. The bicameral English parliament, itself designed for a heterogeneous society, became the model for the two Houses of the American Congress: the House of Representatives and the Senate. In the latter, each state is represented by two senators, regardless of its population. Therefore, one resident of Arkansas has almost the same influence as twenty Californians in the Senate. When the Israeli democracy was formed, the specific needs of Jews and Arabs as distinct nationalities were ignored. The illusory notion of a homogeneous society consisting of a uniform citizenry -- perhaps under the influence of the prevailing antinationalist Marxist ideology -- was embraced only in a formal level. This fallacy, reinforced by the lack of a constitution, led to a totalitarian democracy in which the majority ruled without restrictions, and Arabs as well as political and religious minorities have been discriminated against. The following examples will suffice: * None of the areas inhabited by Arabs has ever been included in the long list of favored "development areas", despite the fact that these are among the most undeveloped areas in the country. * The non-Orthodox branches of Judaism are seriously restricted in their religious rights. * With a major part of the economy controlled by the government and the Histadrut, dissidents and Arabs were deprived of their basic right to equal employment opportunities. The Euro-continental democracy has proven inadequate for both components of our society: * It has failed to ensure the civil rights of the Arab minority. * It jeopardizes the Jews' survival by giving the Arabs the right to vote on issues related to the Jews' security. For example, the weight of the Arab vote in approving the Oslo agreements, which played a decisive role, for better or worse, in determining the future of the Jews. True peace can only be achieved if an authentic liberal approach is adopted. This approach must provide an adequate solution for the dispersed Jewish people, whose survival is threatened as a minority everywhere outside of Israel, and as an isolated enclave amidst a sea of Arab nations. Therefore, the issues of security and immigration must be exclusively in the hands of the Jews. At the same time, the Arabs must also be provided with an adequate frame for autonomous existence, and full enjoy of civil and political rights. This can be achieved within an American-type democracy, in which the principle of strictly egalitarian participation of all citizens in all issues has been wisely sacrificed in favor of a realistic concern for the specific needs of the parts. - - - o - - o - - - (6) Lenin, Wladimir Ilich (1870-1924) "What is to be done?" (1902) (7) It is worth noticing that in the new Constitution the Germans felt need to explicitly establish, what in liberal concepts is self-evident: " They are representatives of the whole people, are not bound by orders and instructions and are subject only to their conscience." (Art. 38) (8) Montesquieu, Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de (1689-1755) "When legislative power is united with executive power in a single person or in a single body of the magistracy, there is no liberty". (9) Alberdi Juan Bautista (1810-84) "Bases, and Start-up Points for the Politic Organization of the Argentine Republic", (1852) "Two powers that generate one the other in this manner, cannot be too independent". (10) Montesquieu o.c. "There need not be much integrity for a monarchical government or despotic government to maintain or sustain itself .... But in a popular state there must be an additional spring, which is VIRTUE.... in a popular government when the laws have ceased to be executed, as this can come only from the corruption of the republic, the state is already lost." 1, 3, 3